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INTRODUCTION 
Feminist domestic violence advocacy has been an important venue for 
theorizing about how to apply concepts like individual autonomy and how 
to intervene strategically and effectively into the dominant, patriarchal 
legal system.  Consistently, feminists have insisted that a woman’s actual, 
lived experiences must form the basis both for her understanding of the 
world and for solutions to problems that she faces in the world.  More 
particularly for feminist domestic violence advocacy, scholars and 
advocates insisted that a woman subjected to abuse1 should have the fullest 
                                                          
 Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.  I owe enormous thanks to 
Tammy Kuennen who has been an ongoing source of inspiration to me throughout this 
piece.  I also owe a debt of gratitude to feminist legal theoretician, Ann Scales, whose 
work and whose encouragement has kept me optimistic about social change.  Her 
untimely death in 2012 is an enormous loss.  I also would like to thank Aya Gruber, 
Helen Norton, Carolyn Ramsey, Pierre Schlag, Ahmed White, and colleagues at the 
University of Colorado Law School workshop for helpful guidance. 
 1. Following the thoughtful guidance of feminist domestic violence advocates and 
scholars like Ann Shalleck and Margaret E. Johnson, I am opting to use the phrase 
“women subjected to abuse” throughout this Article instead of other more-common 
phrases like “victims of domestic violence” or “survivors of domestic violence.”  As 
1
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sense of agency possible as she considers how to move forward in her life 
in light of the domestic violence she has, or continues to, experience. 
As part of privileging individual autonomy, feminist domestic violence 
advocates have been exceedingly reluctant, if not adamant, that others 
working with a woman subjected to abuse should resist interceding in 
autonomous choices.  Feminist domestic violence advocates also have 
thoughtfully and thoroughly critiqued the strategic choices that earlier 
feminists made about how to reform the legal system as choices that lead to 
a system that purports to be woman-centric, but, in fact, is rigid and 
disrespectful to true autonomous choice. 
In crafting their discourse against the current domestic violence legal 
response system, scholars and advocates eliminated important moments of 
nuance.  This Article seeks to reintroduce such nuance by focusing on one 
feature of domestic violence—the role of anger for a woman subjected to 
abuse.  I hope to re-problematize anger by arguing that one can be 
respectful of the experiences of a woman subjected to abuse, including her 
experience of anger, while at the same time insisting that acting out of 
anger is ineffective.  My approach to anger is intentionally pragmatic and 
instrumental.  I embrace feminism’s insistence that real experiences matter.  
However, I illuminate how the rush from emotion to action is deeply 
problematic, and particularly so in the case of anger.  While feminist 
discourse about anger has not been nuanced, I suggest that feminist 
domestic violence practice already contains within it the seeds of a 
productive solution, and that the productive solution is to craft space so that 
the arising of the experience or emotion of anger is disrupted and separated 
from action driven by that experience.  I conclude by offering two possible 
discursive frames that can be used to take advantage of the disruptive 
moment between the arising of an experience or emotion and action upon 
those feelings.  I label the frames as a “healing” frame and a “cognitive” 
                                                          
Professors Shalleck and Johnson have persuasively argued, words like “victim” or 
“survivor” connote a particularized and limited experience with a normative valence, 
all of which can be problematic given the breadth of actual, lived experiences of 
women subjected to abuse in their relationships.  See Margaret Johnson, Redefining 
Harm, Reimaging Remedies, and Reclaiming Domestic Violence Law, 42 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1107, 1163 (2009); Ann Shalleck, Theory and Experience in Constructing the 
Relationship Between Lawyer and Client: Representing Women Who Have Been 
Abused, 64 TENN. L. REV. 1019, 1023-24 (1997).  Further, by using the phrase “women 
subjected to abuse,” I acknowledge that I run the risk of suggesting that men cannot be 
subjected to abuse, or of suggesting that domestic violence happens only within 
heterosexual relationships.  Both suggestions are false, and my choice reflects my 
pragmatic need for a short phrase that I can use with sufficient ease throughout this 
Article.  See generally Natalie J. Sokoloff & Ida Dupont, Violence Against Women, 11 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 38, 38 (2005) (providing a thorough overview regarding 
issues of race, class, gender, and sexual orientation can intersect in complicated ways 
related to domestic violence). 
2
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frame, each of which are designed to draw upon common goals expressed 
by women subjected to abuse—“I want to feel better,” and “I want to make 
the best decisions for me (and for my children).”  I demonstrate how the 
frames can be used to create a disruptive moment.  Both frames use the 
disruptive moment to illuminate that anger is a descriptively true fact, but is 
an ineffective action response to domestic violence. 
I. A BRIEF REVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
ADVOCACY 
Most scholars writing about domestic violence record the start of 
vigorous feminist domestic violence advocacy around the 1970s.2  Legal 
advocacy about domestic violence was part of a larger feminist agenda that 
included issues such as sexual harassment, equal pay, employment 
discrimination, and issues in many other substantive areas of the law in 
which feminists saw the current legal structure as reinforcing women’s 
inequality or subordination.3  In turn, feminists understood the legal system 
as only one example of many institutional structures created by a 
patriarchal society to maintain (white) men’s power and control.4 
Using their own, lived experiences as “data,” feminists assessed that 
patriarchal control was both direct and indirect.5  In its direct form, 
                                                          
 2. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM 9 (2012) [hereinafter GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE]; LISA A. 
GOODMAN & DEBORAH EPSTEIN, LISTENING TO BATTERED WOMEN: A SURVIVOR-
CENTERED APPROACH TO ADVOCACY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND JUSTICE 1 (2008); Jane 
Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 139, 141 (2010); Johnson, supra note 1, at 1124-25; Tamara L. Kuennen, “No 
Drop” Civil Protection Orders: Exploring the Bounds of Judicial Intervention in the 
Lives of Domestic Violence Victims, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 47-48 (2007). 
 3. See generally NANCY LEVIT & ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK, FEMINIST LEGAL 
THEORY: A PRIMER (2006).  Throughout this article, I will refer to feminists working in 
the 1970s forward as “second-wave” feminists. 
 4. Early second-wave feminists were soundly criticized for focusing solely on 
gender as the reason for subordination, and neglecting race or other salient dimensions.  
Later second-wave feminists have been conscientious in acknowledging multiple 
perspectives from which subordination can be experienced.  See generally Kimberle 
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1242-44 (1990); Kimberle Crenshaw, 
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL. F. 139, 140 (1989). 
 5. A key feature of feminism is its methodology, which commits to building 
knowledge from a woman’s own experiences.  It is a “bottom up” methodology in that 
it understands “knowledge” not as objective, neutral fact, but as something generated 
by those holding power and privilege in society.  LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 
45-47. 
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patriarchal control overtly prohibited some behavior or outcome (i.e., 
women could not do “x” or could not be “x,” like serve in the military on 
combat duty).  In its indirect form, patriarchal control constructed concepts 
like “feminine” in a way that circumscribed behavior (i.e., it is unfeminine 
for a woman to raise her voice). 
As it relates to domestic violence, advocates identified both direct and 
indirect control.  Directly, the male-constructed legal system controlled 
access to its protection and prosecution services.  Male police officers 
exercised their discretion against arresting a male abuser when responding 
to a “domestic” call.  Male prosecutors exercised their discretion against 
using available criminal charges, like battery, in many cases in which 
women were making complainants against their male intimate partners.  
Male judges exercised their discretion against issuing protection orders 
when women subjected to abuse were the requesting parties.6  Thus, male 
police officers, prosecutors, and judges controlled when an action 
constituted domestic violence and when a woman was worthy of 
protection.  Feminist domestic violence advocates argued that more often 
than not, such control was exercised in favor of men. 
Indirectly, male-defined social constructions of women and femininity 
insisted that women be well-behaved, which meant submitting to male 
demands and affirmatively working to please a man instead of a woman 
asserting her own needs or desires.7  Male-defined social constructions 
further presumed that if some kind of domestic violence occurred, the 
woman in the relationship must have misbehaved in a way that caused her 
male partner justifiably to be angry with her.  Women were further bound 
by the social construct of society divided into a public sphere in which 
government was encouraged to intervene and a private sphere in which it 
was discouraged.  A feminine woman remained in the private sphere, 
tending hearth and home, and if her male partner abused her, it was a 
private matter into which government (and neighbors, and friends, and 
family) should be very reluctant to intercede. 
Second wave feminists were particularly attuned to the ways in which 
women were, or were not, conscious about how they acceded to male-
dominated society.  Feminists adopted the phrase “false consciousness” to 
capture the dynamic through which women were unconsciously complicit 
                                                          
 6. See Leigh Goodmark, Telling Stories, Saving Lives: The Battered Mothers’ 
Testimony Project, Women’s Narratives, and Court Reform, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 709, 746 
(2005) (describing judicial skepticism towards testimony offered by women subjected 
to abuse); see also GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 11. 
 7. See Marianne Wesson, Mysteries of Violence and Self-Defense: Myths for Men, 
Cautionary Tales for Women, 1 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1, 21 (1992) (detailing a myriad 
of cultural sources for gender stereotypes, including that to be feminine means being 
passive and non-violent). 
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in their own subordination.  The antidote was consciousness raising.8  In 
consciousness raising, groups of women could come together and, through 
the use of their own personal stories and narratives, help each other reveal 
their “false consciousness.”9  In other words, women’s own experiences 
were the means for revealing the ways in which women participated in 
beliefs and activities that reinforced gender stereotypes and subordinated 
them to men.10 
One effect of consciousness raising was that women reclaimed their 
“right” to act in ways that the patriarchy had deemed unfeminine.  
Especially relevant for this discussion is that women asserted that anger 
was an appropriate and necessary response to subordination and that seeing 
anger as unfeminine was a part of the false consciousness constructed by 
the patriarchy.11  Under the male-constructed society, a woman was 
supposed to be nice, not angry.  For feminists, however, if a woman was 
not angry about how society was constructed, then she must not yet have 
shaken the shackles of that male-constructed society.  As one particularly 
ardent feminist put it, truly liberated women were “dominant, secure, self-
confident, nasty, violent, selfish, independent, proud, thrill-seeking, free-
wheeling arrogant females, who consider themselves fit to rule the 
universe.”12 
Feminist commitments to women creating space for their own narratives 
                                                          
 8. Compare LEVIT & VERCHICK, supra note 3, at 49 and CATHARINE A. 
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 84 (1989) (advocating that 
women shatter their oppressive self-reflecting world view and replace it with its own 
image of history), with Christine A. Littleton, Women’s Experience and the Problem of 
Transition: Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 26 
(1989) (noting that “false consciousness” at times has privileged the views of certain 
women, like white women, over others). 
 9. See ANNE FORER, Thoughts on Consciousness-Raising, in FEMINIST 
REVOLUTION: AN ABRIDGED EDITION WITH ADDITIONAL WRITINGS 151 (1978); 
MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 87, 89-90; KATHIE SARACHILD, Consciousness-Raising: 
A Radical Weapon, in FEMINIST REVOLUTION: AN ABRIDGED EDITION WITH 
ADDITIONAL WRITINGS 145 (1978); ANNE SCALES, LEGAL FEMINISM: ACTIVISM, 
LAWYERING, AND LEGAL THEORY 124 (2006). 
 10. See MACKINNON, supra note 8, at 91-92 (arguing that men’s power over 
women is a major part of what defines men as men); SARACHILD, supra note 9, at 145 
(proposing that consciousness raising would make women better fighters for their 
rights). 
 11. See Judith Resnik, Complex Feminist Conversations, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 
5 (1989) (expressing that feminists are ridiculed if they express anger); see also Mari J. 
Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of Coalition, 43 
STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1990) (noting that discomfort remains if identified as 
“angry,” and that women of color can feel a particularized awkwardness). 
 12. VALERIE SOLANAS, SCUM MANIFESTO 70-71 (1968). 
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also helped women break silences about topics like domestic violence.13  
As Lisa Goodman and Deborah Epstein have thoughtfully chronicled, 
feminists assessed domestic violence as a primary example of an issue 
deeply affecting women, but on which male-constructed society benefitted 
by maintaining secrecy and silence.14  Further, feminists insisted that 
domestic violence was as much a political issue as a personal issue, and 
that responses to domestic violence needed to include not only solutions for 
a woman’s safety and shelter, but also for increasing her political 
empowerment.15  Thus, feminists collaborated to create women-staffed and 
directed shelters that were “decentralized and nonhierarchical,” where both 
staff and women receiving services were seen as having useful expertise.16  
Women subjected to abuse were experts on their own situations and needs, 
providing the necessary individualized information staff needed to help 
each woman craft an effective plan for safety and empowerment.17 
In addition to community work building up shelters and support groups 
in the 1970s, feminist domestic violence advocates also were making 
strategic choices about how to engage the legal system.  There, advocates 
assessed that to be most effective, they would have to be able to answer the 
primary question posed by the non-feminist dominant society—why a 
woman in an abusive relationship would not leave that relationship.18  As 
Leigh Goodmark has exceptionally documented, in that first phase of 
domestic violence advocacy, feminists took account of women’s actual 
experiences interacting with the legal system up to that point.  Most 
importantly, advocates were clear-eyed that the legal system was skeptical 
about whether women were even subjected to abuse as well as reluctant to 
intervene in matters the system had treated as private, personal relationship 
matters.19  However, advocates were also pragmatic and determined that 
                                                          
 13. See GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4 (positing that women’s 
involvement in political reform could shape the type of assistance received in domestic 
violence situations). 
 14. See id. at 31-32 (demonstrating clear connections between violence against 
women and women’s inequality in the workplace and in the family). 
 15. See id. at 32-33 (emphasizing that political and social advocacy should be 
preferred for women facing domestic violence rather than psychological treatment 
because domestic violence arises out of social and economic inequality rather than 
individual psychopathology). 
 16. See id. at 35. 
 17. See id. at 34-35 (stating that a woman could view her suffering through a social 
and political framework). 
 18. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing 
that legal structures promulgated the domination of men over women); Aiken & 
Goldwasser, supra note 2, at 159-60 (explaining that abusers often leave women so 
demoralized after abuse that they do not have support systems to rely on). 
 19. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 13 (stating that 
6
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the best advocacy strategy was to work for reforms within the system, 
leading them to concede that they had to address the question posed by the 
system—“why doesn’t she just leave him?”20 
Advocates responded by applying the theory of learned helplessness, 
originally developed by psychologist Martin Seligman, and tailored to 
domestic violence by Lenore Walker.21  Learned helplessness justified a 
woman’s choice to stay in an abusive relationship, re-characterizing her 
actions as a lack of capacity for autonomous choice rather than as a 
personal failure to exercise autonomous choice.22  Because learned 
helplessness precluded a woman from exercising agency and leaving the 
relationship, the legal system had an obligation to intercede and to 
manufacture an ability for the woman subjected to abuse to leave the 
relationship.23 
As feminist scholars and advocates thoughtfully chronicled, the 
consequences of relying on learned helplessness were mixed.  The strategy 
provided an out for some women subjected to abuse from being blamed for 
their abusive relationship.  It also provided those women with a narrative 
that the patriarchal legal system accepted as deserving of intervention to 
gain some protection against their abusers.  However, the system insisted 
that the “protection” have an ultimate goal of separating the woman and 
abuser and ending their relationship.24  Further, the learned helplessness 
narrative had the negative consequence of creating a class of “undeserving” 
women—those who did not adopt learned helplessness as their story, or 
                                                          
some feminists felt turning to the state for help was simply trading the regulation of one 
individual man for the institutional power of other men). 
 20. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 82-83; see also 
Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential 
Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989) (noting that “outsider” advocates, like 
feminists or advocates of color, well-understand how existing power structures 
maintain outsider domination, while also understanding the necessity of using the 
“elitist legal system” to seek reform). 
 21. GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 31; GOODMAN & 
EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 52. 
 22. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 31 (positing that the 
learned helplessness cycle inevitably repeated until the death of a party to the 
relationship or a woman’s decision to leave the relationship); GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, 
supra note 2, at 52-53 (detailing the three steps in the learned helplessness cycle: the 
tension building stage, the acute battering incident, and the loving contrition stage). 
 23. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 31-32 (establishing 
that judges recognized and adopted the learned helplessness theory of a cycle of 
violence in their decision-making); GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 53 (stating 
that learned helplessness was the way that advocates justified the need for public 
intervention). 
 24. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 81 (noting that 
women lost credibility if they did not immediately report abuse to law enforcement). 
7
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who otherwise chose not to leave their relationships.25 
The category of “undeserving” women was broad.  It included women 
who responded with unfeminine emotions like anger, and who were not 
passive.26  It included women who made a more capacious assessment of 
what resources it would take to be on their own (or on their own with 
children), and who assessed that it was riskier for them (or for the children) 
to leave the relationship than to stay.27  Most importantly, the category of 
“undeserving” women often ended up describing poor women and women 
of color.28 
In sum, the initial trajectory of feminist domestic violence advocacy, as 
it met and was recalibrated by the patriarchal legal system, created a 
unidirectional and limited decision making path.  If a woman was subjected 
to abuse, she either could leave the relationship quietly or show that she 
could not because of learned helplessness.  If she sought help from the 
legal system for protection, or sought access to support services, then she 
confirmed that the goal was to leave the relationship permanently.  She 
could not fuss, complain, and had to do exactly what she was told to do by 
the experts in the legal system (i.e., the prosecutor, the judge, the social 
worker).  If she did not, then she was labeled a liar, or unreliable, or 
unworthy of help. 
Noting the limits of the learned helplessness narrative, some feminist 
domestic violence advocates and scholars pushed back to insist upon the 
appropriateness of women subjected to abuse responding in anger or by 
fighting back.  Advocates and scholars demanded that society and the legal 
system acknowledge that women subjected to abuse were justified in their 
anger.29  They noted that because society did not begrudge a man becoming 
                                                          
 25. See id. at 63-64 (stating that the passivity stereotype created serious issues for 
women who chose to fight back against their partners); Shalleck, supra note 1, at 1026 
(affirming that a woman who chose not to adopt the standard abuse story was denied 
protection by the legal system). 
 26. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 65; see also 
Margaret B. Drew, Collaboration and Coercion, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79, 87 
(2013) (“[t]here is no uniform, predictable response to trauma [like domestic violence].  
Some targets [of domestic violence] will be angry, verbally aggressive, and demanding.  
Some may have fought back, while others are passive and quiet.”). 
 27. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 96 (arguing that 
courts’ separation based remedies placed a value judgment on relationships); Littleton, 
supra note 8, at 38 (maintaining that the legal system’s reliance on the cycle of 
violence causes does not tackle the underlying and central problems of battery and 
abuse: male violence, male power, and gender hierarchy). 
 28. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 70-73 (contending 
that victimhood is a white norm and that service systems are not culturally competent 
to adequately provide for them). 
 29. Id. at 76-77 (noting that victim stereotypes only validate a small percentage of 
8
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angry if someone hit him, it should not begrudge a woman for feeling 
similarly.  In fact, expressing anger has been seen in some therapeutic 
models as the best way forward through a difficult situation.30 
Further, by reclaiming anger, women were asserting “rightness” along 
two dimensions.  First, advocates righted domestic violence advocacy, 
which had unfortunately tilted to the patriarchal construction of women as 
passive and as unfeminine if expressing anger.  Second, advocates asserted 
that it was morally appropriate for a woman subjected to abuse to feel and 
express anger.  As legal philosopher Jeffrie Murphy might put it, there is a 
moral place for “retributive” hatred as a way of asserting and preserving 
one’s self-respect.31  As is often the case, however, both of the corrections 
generated their own consequences in the form of a new narrative.  Now, in 
addition to the narrative of the powerless, helpless victim in need of 
rescuing by the state, there was also the heroic, resistance fighter taking a 
stand against abuse.  As Ann Shalleck noted, women subjected to abuse 
could go “from being stereotypical victims to stereotypical heroes.”32 
The opportunity to get stuck in the dichotomy of victim or hero remains, 
but feminist theorizing about domestic violence has continued to expand its 
trajectory.  Observant of the consequences of earlier strategies, several 
feminist scholars called on advocates and scholars to reimagine what 
domestic violence advocacy would look like if it took a truly woman-
centric approach.  For example, Leigh Goodmark has argued that a woman-
centric approach would not essentialize any particular feature of being a 
woman or of being a woman in an abusive relationship.  As she has 
explained: 
An anti-essentialist system would be premised on the importance of 
giving individual women as much power as possible, to the greatest 
extent possible, to define the abuse they experience and decide how it 
should be addressed.  Recognizing that women share one facet of 
identity but diverge among many other axes of identity, an anti-
essentialist system would accept that women’s experiences of abuse vary 
dramatically and must be considered contextually.33 
Similarly, Deborah Epstein and Lisa Goodman described the needed 
reforms thus: 
[B]attered women’s individual voices need to be brought back to the 
                                                          
women facing abuse because an angry woman is not a “good victim”). 
 30. See generally JOHN LEE ET AL., FACING THE FIRE: EXPERIENCING AND 
EXPRESSING ANGER APPROPRIATELY (1993) (discussing that expressing anger allows a 
person to become a more actualized and authentic version of his or herself). 
 31. JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, Hatred: A Qualified Defense, in FORGIVENESS AND 
MERCY 103 (1988). 
 32. Shalleck, supra note 1, at 1043. 
 33. GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 138. 
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forefront of reform efforts.  Those who are attempting to help battered 
women must honor the differences in their individual needs by creating 
opportunities for their voices to be heard and for them to play an active 
role in shaping the assistance they receive.34 
The hopefulness above for improving the trajectory of domestic violence 
advocacy depends critically on individualness, and individual choice as the 
method by which women will be able to assert their own expert knowledge 
on how best to respond to the abuse they face.  A woman might choose a 
range of emotional responses from hatred to forgiveness, and maybe even 
move through several responses.35  A woman might choose to call upon 
law enforcement, or not; to call upon a prosecutor, or not; to seek 
restorative justice services, or not.36  The strategy then, is to reform a 
current system that is too rigid by insisting that the system must defer to all 
choices made by a woman subjected to abuse because autonomous choices, 
as empowered choices, are better choices. 
II. RE-PROBLEMATIZING ANGER IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVOCACY 
As part of committing to empowering individual choice, feminist 
domestic violence advocates have been circumspect about categorically 
removing any kind of choice a woman might make.  The instinct to remain 
highly neutral about women’s individual choices has been fostered in part 
because of the way the male-defined legal system moved quickly to rigid 
categorical approaches—i.e., that all women subjected to abuse must leave, 
that all domestic violence calls must result in an arrest, and that no 
protection orders can be dropped.  But, more positively, it is a mechanism 
for protecting space in the decision making process for the information and 
perspectives of the person most at risk and most affected by those 
decisions.  To use the language of evidence, if there is a conclusive 
presumption that the choices of a woman subjected to abuse set the course 
of action, then advocates, or the legal system, or social services have strong 
incentives to include the woman subjected to abuse in the decision making 
process.  If they fail to include her, they have violated the appropriate 
process and their own decisions are at risk. 
I strongly support the idea that a woman subjected to abuse brings 
important expertise to the discussion about her situation and possible 
solutions to her challenges.  Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that in 
                                                          
 34. GOODMAN & EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 4. 
 35. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 2, at 139-41 (advocating 
that the definitions of safety and accountability become more fluid to truly help all 
women affected by domestic violence). 
 36. See id. at 139 (noting that an individualized framework acknowledges the 
complexity of women’s experiences with abuse). 
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domestic violence there is at least one specific choice that should be 
understood as problematic and not deferred to.  That is a choice to act in 
anger.  I want to re-problematize anger in domestic violence, but to do so 
without reverting back to unhelpful notions of anger as unfeminine or anger 
as repressed because of learned helplessness. 
I want to distinguish carefully between the fact of anger’s arising or the 
experience of the sensations of anger, and anger as action or choice of 
conduct.  I suggest that the practical and beneficial result of acknowledging 
the arising or sensations of anger, but resisting acting on anger, is that 
domestic violence advocates will remain alert and sensitive to the actual, 
lived experiences of women subjected to abuse.  Advocates also will 
remain alert to the ways in which women subjected to abuse need protected 
spaces where they can articulate and deconstruct those experiences.  At the 
same time, advocates will be clear that anger is not an effective course of 
action, thus, they will not shy away from frank, engaged conversations 
intended to dissuade women subjected to abuse from acting solely out of 
anger. 
A. Why Anger is an Ineffective Response 
As should be clear at this juncture, I am taking a pragmatic and 
instrumental approach to anger.  I am not asking whether anger itself is 
morally justified along some deontological grounds.  I am taking a 
pragmatic approach because that is the approach in large part taken by 
feminists.  Thus, I want to consider anger on the same terms as it has been 
embraced. 
In order to demonstrate that anger is an ineffective response to domestic 
violence, I first need to be clear about what is an effective response.  And, 
to do that, I also need to be clear about the personal goals at hand when a 
woman subjected to abuse is seeking change.  There are several goals in 
play at the same time, and I am going to suggest that they roughly cluster 
into two inter-related categories: issues related to logistics and issues 
related to longer term flourishing. 
Logistics include issues such as planning about safety; investigating 
available resources to support pressing choices related to housing, care for 
children, transportation, emotional support and the like; and, planning for 
immediate needs for health care, including mental health services.  
Flourishing goals include building a sense of empowerment (emotionally 
and economically), moving towards a more steady state of emotional and 
physical well-being, building a sense of belonging and connectedness 
within some community, and determining what kind of longer term 
connectedness is or is not appropriate with the abuser.  It is clear how 
closely tied the categories are, as the ease or difficulty with which a woman 
is able to address logistical goals directly affects her ability to lead a 
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flourishing life in a longer term way. 
For example, if a woman subjected to abuse determines that she and her 
children need to live separately from her abuser, but there is no housing 
available near her that she can afford, then she faces some challenging 
choices.  She might have to move to a community in which she has no ties 
because that is where she can find affordable housing.  It may or may not 
be a community in which she would otherwise choose to live.  Her move 
might mean she has to quit her current job because there is no reliable 
transportation to get her from her new home to her job.  She likely has to 
disrupt her children’s lives by separating them from friends, school, or 
family.  Each of those logistical challenges impinges on a person’s sense of 
empowerment and sense of leading a flourishing life. 
I want to be clear that my two general categories of goals contain a wide 
range of more specific concerns that we often refer to as “goals.”  For 
example, some of the women subjected to abuse with whom I have worked 
have talked about having a goal of retribution against their abusers.  And, 
some women with whom I have worked have talked about having a goal to 
reconcile with their abusers.  I do not mean my two general categories of 
logistics and flourishing to squelch more-specifically described concerns 
articulated by women subjected to abuse, but only to organize those 
specific concerns in a more manageable fashion. 
So, then, how does anger relate to logistical goals and longer term 
flourishing goals?  To demonstrate how anger complicates achieving those 
goals, let me offer a vignette.37  Imagine Allison, a woman subjected to 
abuse, who has two children with her husband, Nate, the abuser.  Nate has 
been a very controlling husband.  Among other actions, when Allison had 
their children, Nate insisted that Allison stop her work as a certified nurse 
assistant, even though they relied on her income.  He threatened Allison 
with physical violence or control if she did not comply.  To make up the 
lost income, Nate picked up overtime hours at his job as a janitor at a 
commercial building.  Nate dictates much of Allison’s daily life—telling 
her what she can wear, locking away the remote control for the television 
so she cannot watch it when he is away, checking the mileage on her car to 
make sure she does not drive more than he has permitted, and threatening 
to lock her in a room if she does not comply with his requests.  While Nate 
shows Allison little or erratic affection, he has been an engaged and loving 
father to their two children.  He is strict with them, but seems happy when 
he and the children are doing things together.  The children, too, seem very 
happy with their father. 
                                                          
 37. I created the vignette from the facts of an actual case in which I represented the 
woman subjected to abuse.  I changed the names of the parties and have kept out of the 
vignette some facts that might jeopardize the anonymous nature of the vignette. 
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Both Allison and Nate have family who live near them.  For several 
years, Allison’s sister has been telling Allison that she should leave Nate.  
Allison’s sister has offered for Allison and her children to stay with her for 
as long as they need.  It would be cramped at the sister’s house, but 
Allison’s children would still be able to attend the same school. 
When Allison decides that she wants to end her marriage to Nate, a 
primary way that she feels strong enough to go through with that choice is 
by feeling angry at Nate.  Her anger leads her to feel that Nate “should 
pay” for all of the degradation he has committed towards her.  Allison 
decides that one of the best ways to make Nate pay is to leave the 
relationship in such a way that Nate is not able to see the children.  She 
knows that there is a shelter across town and knows that the shelter will 
keep her and her children’s identities secret. 
One weekend when Nate is working overtime, Allison takes the children 
and goes to the shelter.  She does not leave Nate any kind of note because 
she wants him to experience high anxiety like the level she feels she has 
experienced because of his controlling behavior.  On the following 
Monday, Allison keeps the children from school because she knows Nate 
will go there to try and find them. 
She goes to the local court to ask for an emergency, temporary civil 
protection order.  She asks the court to include the children because she 
continues to feel like Nate should pay (although she does not say that to the 
court).  The court grants Allison’s request and the order bars Nate from 
contact with Allison and the children. 
As the civil protection order proceedings go forward and are 
consolidated into a divorce proceeding, Allison makes several other 
choices motivated by her anger at Nate.  She chooses to move into 
subsidized housing that is on the other side of town from where Nate works 
and where they used to live.  The new housing is not near Allison’s sister 
and it is in a different school district.  Allison initially insists to the court 
that any parenting time that Nate will have with the children must be 
supervised by a third party.  She insists that the children must spend all 
overnight times with her, and that parenting time must end before the 
children’s current bedtime of 7:00 p.m., even though that means Nate 
effectively would not be able to have parenting time during the week 
because of his work schedule. 
There are several ways that Allison’s choices from anger make her life, 
and her children’s lives, unnecessarily harder.  For example, Allison and 
her children live in a shelter for a period of time instead of moving in with 
Allison’s sister.  Allison makes that choice primarily to punish Nate, and 
not because she is afraid for her or her children’s safety.  The move to the 
shelter disrupts the children’s daily schedules in a more severe way than 
had Allison moved to her sister’s.  Further, both Allison and her children 
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are more disconnected from their support systems at the shelter than they 
would have been at her sister’s house.  Similarly, Allison’s angry choice 
initially to seek a civil protection order and her later choices about 
parenting time between Nate and the children have the effect of putting the 
children in the middle of the divorce.  Allison’s choices also give the 
hyper-controlling Nate an unhelpfully heightened sense of entitlement, 
encouraging him to portray himself as the good parent and Allison as the 
bad parent (i.e., “I just want to be a father to my kids. Look at how she’s 
trying to prevent that.”)  That sense of entitlement makes Nate more 
unwilling to think about a parenting time schedule that mutually 
accommodates his and Allison’s needs.  Simply put, Allison’s angry 
choices make things needlessly harder. 
I expect that at this point many domestic violence advocates may, 
themselves, be angry as they read my conclusions about Allison.  To some, 
I have painted too simplistic a picture, as choices for most women are 
never made just in anger.  To others, I have demeaned Allison’s 
courageous choice to start to move beyond Nate’s abuse, in whatever way 
she was able to get to that point.  Finally, I have only talked about Allison’s 
actions, and have not criticized Nate even though he is the abuser and he 
has acted out of anger as well.  Let me acknowledge the criticisms, and 
seek forbearance. 
First, I, too, am certain that few women will experience only one 
emotion as they work through decisions about how to respond to an 
abusive relationship.  Allison likely would be unusual if she only felt anger.  
(In fact, over the course of the actual case Allison felt many emotions in 
addition to anger.)  Nonetheless, Allison’s vignette helps to tease out the 
difference between ineffective choices and complicated choices.  A simpler 
vignette enables us to see decision making moments, so that we know the 
important points on which to focus as we add complications or nuances to 
the vignette.  Next, I want to be clear that my assertion that anger is an 
ineffective response is not an assertion that a person will not experience the 
rising of anger and its powerful sensations and not need a way to deal with 
that experience.  Finally, my focus on Allison is not acceptance of Nate’s 
behavior or role, but only an acknowledgment that domestic violence 
advocates generally will work first and most closely with the person 
subjected to abuse in the relationship.  Let me develop my responses to 
each concern more fully. 
B. Things Are Always More Complicated. 
 To think through whether anger still matters when the setting is more 
complicated, consider the decision making point for Allison when she 
chooses not to leave Nate a note as she leaves with the children.  In the 
vignette, Allison is angry and expresses her anger to punish Nate by not 
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leaving a note.  Presumably, Nate does experience great anxiety, leading to 
anger, and possibly leading Nate to plan retributive, hurtful actions in 
response (like calling the police and reporting that Allison has kidnapped 
the children).  Staying with the simple vignette, if Allison had a moment to 
be able to separate her sensations and experiences of anger from her 
actions, she might have thought about leaving some sort of note for Nate.  
It might have said only that she and the children had left for some safe, 
undisclosed place, that she had not left the state, and that she would contact 
Nate shortly to start to work through a divorce.  While Nate may very well 
still have been angry, the note helps to protect Allison from Nate making 
unfounded charges that she had kidnapped the children.  (In fact, Nate 
argued to the court that Allison should not continue to be the primary 
caretaker for the children because her actions suggested that she was 
thinking about fleeing permanently.) 
Complicate the vignette and add the fact that while Allison generally was 
not worried about Nate responding with physical violence, she was worried 
that he would do so if she ever actually left the relationship, especially if 
she left with the kids.  With that complication, her choice not to leave a 
note was motivated by anger and safety concerns.  However, Allison’s 
anger may have prevented her from thinking through more fully whether 
leaving a note actually helped her safety concerns.  As noted above, Allison 
may be at greater risk of triggering Nate by leaving him with absolutely no 
information about her and the children compared with leaving him a note 
with minimal information. 
Similarly, consider Allison’s choice to go across town to the local shelter 
and stay there initially with her children.  That choice means that the 
children move into an unfamiliar space with people they do not know and 
with the additional consequence of disrupting their daily school routine.  
Those are notable consequences for the children that result from Allison 
expressing her anger at Nate.  Those consequences may well have been 
able to be reduced had Allison instead chosen to stay initially with her 
sister.  If the children inquire why they have to stay at the shelter, Allison 
will either have to tell the truth that she acted out of anger, likely an 
uncomfortable admission, or lie to the children, also uncomfortable and 
maybe unconvincing. 
Again, complicate the vignette and add that Allison is worried about the 
possibility that Nate will respond volatilely.  Allison is concerned it will be 
too risky for her sister if she goes there as Nate will likely come over.  So, 
Allison chooses the shelter because it will better protect her and her sister.  
Or, add the fact that at the time Allison decides to leave, it turns out that 
her sister’s children have come down with chicken pox and are still 
contagious.  With either of those facts, Allison’s choice to go to the shelter 
might be the only one available to her initially.  While that choice still 
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might be very disruptive for the children, Allison will be able to talk 
genuinely with her children about it being a temporary step—until her 
sister’s children are no longer contagious, or until Nate has some time to 
move beyond his own initial reactions, and the like. 
Further, by removing anger, Allison may be able to think through other 
options that would navigate the risk of Nate’s volatility while also reducing 
the disruption in her children’s lives.  For example, if Allison believes that 
Nate would lash out at her, but not the children, then maybe Allison’s sister 
could step in for a short time to drop off and pick up the children from their 
regular school.  Allison could alert school personnel to her situation and her 
sister’s role so that they would be aware of reasons that the children might 
be behaving differently. 
I am certain that every advocate reading about Allison is able to recount 
working with a woman similar to Allison who made choices like Allison’s, 
but who did not have any other alternatives at the time, and, thus, had no 
choice but to bear the negative consequences I have described.  Again, I am 
not offering Allison’s story to prove that a woman just needs to think hard 
enough about options—a very demeaning perspective, assuredly.  Instead, I 
am offering Allison’s story as a way to illustrate that when one is at a 
decision making point at which one option is anger and another option is 
not, taking the non-anger option is more effective. 
Again, I am proposing that non-anger is more effective in terms of 
navigating logistical challenges and in terms of leading to longer term 
flourishing.  However, for a woman subjected to abuse, like Allison, who 
wishes to act out of anger, it may be that her sense of efficacy is tied to 
expressing anger.  So, let me now explore further the concern that my 
approach is demeaning or dismissive of the personal experiences of women 
subjected to abuse. 
C. Any Emotion That Helps a Woman Start to Respond to Abuse is Good. 
 As I noted earlier, feminist domestic violence advocates insisted that the 
relevant perspective for the legal system to understand and respond to is the 
perspective of the woman subjected to abuse, not some artificial “average 
reasonable person,” nor some stereotypical, “feminine” woman.  Advocates 
assert that to effectuate that commitment, one must understand that a 
woman subjected to abuse is what she is—scared, angry, committed, sad, 
or any other of a myriad responses.  From the given fact that a woman 
reports her specific response, whether anger or otherwise, advocates insist 
that the only normative choice is to accept the response.  To do otherwise, 
such as dismiss or disagree with the response, would be disempowering, 
disrespectful, and arrogant.  Further, implied in the prescription that one 
should encourage whatever response arises for a woman subjected to abuse 
is that expressing any response ultimately helps a woman lead a more 
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flourishing life.  Or, to put it another way, the first step to moving towards 
a flourishing life is to express the actual experience one is having. 
The crux move above is to tie completely together experience/ 
sensation/emotion with action, and to say an experience/sensation/emotion 
is not valid until it is acted upon.  I am suggesting that we think through 
more thoroughly the consequences of coupling experience and its action, 
especially as it relates to anger.  I am also suggesting that there is a way to 
decouple experience and its action so that it is empowering, respectful, and 
encouraging of the move towards a flourishing life. 
Interestingly, the key first step to usefully decoupling experience and its 
action is to insist that feminists are right that the experience of a woman 
subjected to abuse must be taken on its own terms as descriptively and 
factually true.  The phrase “it is what it is” captures well what needs to 
happen in the first step.  For example, if a woman reports that she is angry, 
one needs to hear that as a statement of a descriptive, actual fact, full stop.  
There is no reply such as “Well, don’t you really mean you are scared?” 
Or, “But, you’re not an angry person.” Or, “You’re going to have to get 
past that for the sake of the children.”  Anger is what it is. 
Acknowledging the fact or existence of a particular response is 
empowering for the woman who is experiencing it.  It is empowering 
because it confirms and validates for a woman that she has agency.  In fact, 
her response is a kind of action in that she has permitted herself to feel and 
to acknowledge the arising of the emotion.  Acknowledging the fact of the 
emotion is also empowering because it encourages a woman to see the 
possibility of finding a supportive community—that someone is listening to 
the response and taking it as factually true must mean that there are others 
who have had similar experiences. 
In other words, the experience of anger (or any other response/emotion) 
itself provides a critical opportunity for advocates working with women 
subjected to abuse not to rush past the moment.  Instead, advocates can 
expand the moment and use it to reflect back to the woman who was 
subjected to abuse, respect for the lived fact of her specific experience, to 
acknowledge the agency connoted by the woman’s response, and to 
reaffirm to the woman that she is not alone or isolated in her experience.  
Further, it is critical to remember that emotions arise constantly and 
repeatedly.  Thus, a woman subjected to abuse will not feel one key 
moment in which anger arises.  She likely will experience anger arising 
many times, sometimes exceedingly strongly and sometimes weakly.  Each 
moment of anger’s arising provides an important and useful opportunity to 
pause and offer respect for a woman’s lived experience. 
Additionally, insisting on stopping to take time to acknowledge the 
arising of emotion reminds us that we cannot eliminate the fact of 
emotions, but we can reflect upon and control what actions we take in 
17
Cantrell: Re-Problematizing Anger in Domestic Violence Advocacy
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2013
854 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 21:4 
response to the emotion.  The pause usefully disrupts the habituated 
connection between the experience of an emotion and the action associated 
with the emotion.  The arising of the emotion itself provides a woman with 
crucial information about her situation, particularly strong negative 
emotions like anger or fear.  When the situation triggers a strong negative 
emotion, it alerts a person that something is seriously wrong about the 
setting.  When a person experiences a strong negative emotion, it is hard to 
brush the sensations aside, whether those sensations are physical, like rapid 
breathing and a pounding pulse, or mental, like an internal voice one is 
hearing at an intense and insistent pitch.  While those intense experiences 
beneficially ensure that a person is alert to the potential hazards of her 
setting, those experiences often do not contain enough information from 
which a person can discern the range of choices she has about what actions 
to take, and what the consequences might be of different choices about 
actions.  Creating a disruptive moment between the arising of emotion and 
acting upon it is the key second step in the decoupling of experience and 
action, which, in turn, leads to better decision making.  I will return shortly 
to how one might create a productive disruptive moment, but let me first 
consider the final concern that Allison’s vignette might pose—that it puts 
the burden of conduct entirely on Allison and allows Nate to continue to be 
a bad actor. 
D. A Woman Subjected to Abuse Should Not  
Bear the Entire Burden of Conduct. 
As I noted earlier, part of the reluctance and nervousness of feminist 
domestic violence advocates about categorically removing any particular 
choice made by a woman subjected to abuse is that is puts women at risk of 
other hostile categorical assumptions.  So, the worry is that it will be 
acceptable to assess Allison’s situation as follows: Allison should not act 
on her anger because women are not supposed to get angry, not because 
acting on anger leads to ineffective solutions for Allison.  Further, Nate 
recedes from the story, and his behavior is not scrutinized to the same 
degree as is Allison’s behavior.  Thus, Allison bears the entire burden of 
conduct.  To that reasonable concern, I think the answer is exceedingly 
pragmatic.  Domestic violence advocates work most often with those 
subjected to abuse not those perpetrating abuse.  Thus, the opportunities to 
assist more likely will come on the disempowered side of the abusive 
relationship. 
That being said, it is crucial that the conversation about categorically 
discouraging action out of anger be framed as discouraging all participants’ 
actions out of anger—the woman subjected to abuse, the abuser, other 
family members involved, other professionals involved, and advocates 
themselves.  Such a framing makes clear that each participant is expected 
18
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol21/iss4/3
2013] RE-PROBLEMATIZING ANGER 855 
and obligated to make good choices about conduct. 
The framing also subtly signals another important feature about domestic 
violence work—that it inherently involves a web of relationships.  The 
conduct of each person in that web affects every other person in the web.  
Nate’s actions affect Allison as she reacts to him.  Then affect the children 
as they react both to Nate and to their mother.  Then affect the children’s 
schoolmates as those schoolmates react to the changes in the children, and 
so on.  Acknowledging the interconnectedness of each person rebuts the 
idea that the conduct of only one person in the web is relevant.  It also 
illuminates the potential for activating the web of relationships positively 
as well as negatively.  One’s conduct can create positive ripples through the 
web or negative ripples.  Of course, one’s positive or negative ripples can 
be met in kind or in opposition.  In other words, the web of relationships 
puts everyone’s conduct in the mix, but one has full control only over one’s 
own actions. 
Let me now consider how advocates and the women with whom they are 
working can find the positive potential in the fact that they are in a web of 
relationships and the positive potential of the fact that there is a disruptive 
moment that can be created between the experience of emotion/response 
and resulting conduct. 
III. TAKING ADVANTAGE OF DISRUPTION 
As I noted, taking advantage of the disruptive moment means first 
acknowledging it, including acknowledging the fact that emotions like 
anger always will arise, and then reinforcing that there is a difference 
between the fact that an emotion like anger has arisen and the choice to 
express the emotion through action.  It means taking the micro moment 
when an emotion occurs and expanding it so as to break the conditioned, 
rushed move from sensation to action.  That then creates the space in which 
one has time to acknowledge overtly the disruptive moment.  As I already 
suggested, that space between sensation and action is the place at which 
one can effectively and supportively affirm the fact of the emotion so that 
the lesson one is teaching is not that emotions inherently are bad or good, 
they just “are what they are.” 
Instrumentally, however, when the emotion is anger, the affirmation 
should be followed by an overtly normative conversation about the 
consequences of acting in anger.  The fact of anger “is what it is,” but 
acting out anger is bad/good, helpful/unhelpful, or destructive/protective.  
At this point, I hear a sharp intake of breathe from some readers who decry 
my move into normativity as exactly the wrong move.  I expect my move is 
upsetting because the usual language that feminist advocates have used to 
talk about working with women subjected to abuse is that an advocate’s job 
is to create a safe and open space in which women can talk without being 
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told that they are bad, abnormal, or immoral.  For example, on a blog for 
and by women subjected to abuse, a writer talked about how angry she was 
at her family because she was not feeling supported by them as she dealt 
with the emotional turmoil of leaving her abuser.38  She received some very 
candid and direct advice from the blogger: “immediately stop worry[ing] 
about what others think . . . .  If the person isn’t supporting you . . . don’t 
even talk to them at all.”39  If that advice is typical, my prescription to 
overtly talk about actions as good or bad, helpful or unhelpful, appears to 
go squarely against what a supportive person is supposed to do if she is 
working within a feminist framework in which she is trying to enhance the 
autonomous choices of a woman subjected to abuse. 
Framing the discourse as about autonomous choice tends to cause us to 
talk about good decision making as meaning that the only relevant person 
in the decision making is the woman subjected to abuse.  That then causes 
us to describe the relevant way to frame an autonomy-enhancing question 
to the woman subjected to abuse as, “What do you want”?  We then 
describe the autonomy-enhancing frame as requiring us to accept the 
woman’s answer without further inquiry. 
But, my experience working with feminist domestic violence advocates, 
and my own experience as a feminist domestic violence advocate say that 
how we actually do our work is more nuanced and complicated than the 
discourse we have created to describe it.  More particularly, advocates are 
able to create space for a woman subjected to abuse to be affirmed as she 
recounts her experiences, while then expanding the conversation to include 
pragmatic and normative choices.  Part of why we have not understood 
what we are doing as two different and separate stages, is that we have 
described what we are doing as one action—we are listening. 
For example, advocates learn that they need to use “active” listening, 
which has been described as “a range of approaches through which a 
lawyer can create connections with her client by withholding judgment and 
expressly acknowledging facts, emotions and/or positive qualities of 
character expressed by the client.”40  With active listening, an advocate first 
                                                          
 38. The blog is called “The Last Straw,” and the entry I am describing is one of the 
most frequently viewed.  Rebecca Burns, Aftermath of Abuse: Dealing with Anger 
After Domestic Abuse, THE LAST STRAW (July 8, 2007), 
https://thelaststraw.wordpress.com/2007/07/08/aftermath-of-abuse-dealing-with-anger-
after-domestic-abuse/. 
 39. Id. 
 40. STEPHEN ELLMAN ET. AL., LAWYERS AND CLIENTS: CRITICAL ISSUES IN 
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING 27 (2009); see also Leigh Goodmark, Clinical 
Cognitive Dissonance: The Values and Goals of Domestic Violence Clinics, the Legal 
System, and the Students Caught in the Middle, 2 J.L. & POL’Y 301, 307 (2013) (noting 
that the credo of one particular domestic violence clinic is “less lawyering and more 
listening”). 
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affirms what she has heard to underscore to her conversation partner that 
the advocate is listening thoroughly and empathetically.  However, the 
advocate then asks open-ended clarifying and expanding questions so as to 
understand the factual situation more expansively, as well as the emotional 
situation.  It is in the expanding and clarifying “listening” stage that an 
advocate often starts to explore pragmatic and normative choices in a 
gentle and non-confrontational manner.  An advocate working with Allison 
from the earlier hypothetical might ask questions like: “Tell me about the 
range of choices you think you might have about where to stay when you 
move out, from the easiest choice to the hardest,” or “What do you think 
are the best characteristics about the kind of relationship that Nate has with 
the children,” or “What are your biggest worries about this situation and 
what your children are experiencing?” 
One purpose of the expanding and clarifying questions assuredly is to 
elicit more information.  Importantly, the questions also generally expand 
the range of viewpoints that are being considered, but in a way that does 
not make the talker feel unsupported, or put her in a defensive posture.  The 
non-directed approach still solicits information from the talker’s vantage 
point, although the talker is asked to report about what she thinks someone 
else’s point of view might be. 
Further, the advocate is not a silent partner in the conversation.  At some 
point, the advocate’s own expertise and information will be offered up.  
Thinking about Allison again, at some point she might ask what the court 
hearing looks like if she wants to seek a protection order.  Or, she might 
disclose that Nate has been in charge of making the payment on the auto 
loan related to her car.  She might ask whether there would be a way to 
make sure he continues to make those payments during the time she is 
trying to sort out how to proceed related to their marriage.  At some point, 
it is highly likely that Allison will ask what her advocate thinks about 
Allison’s proposed course of conduct, or ask her advocate more generally 
what the advocate thinks Allison should do.  No matter what the advocate’s 
answer, it will express a normative point of view.  Even if the advocate 
declines to answer, that expresses the advocate’s normative choice that 
silence is “better” for the client—likely because the advocate wants to 
protect Allison’s autonomy and worries that expressing any opinion at all 
would cause Allison to defer to the advocate in a disempowering way. 
I have thoroughly argued elsewhere that for normative conversations to 
be truly mutual, respectful, and empowering, they must be overt and 
transparent.41  It is only by overtly surfacing the normative issues in play 
                                                          
 41. See Deborah J. Cantrell, What’s Love Got to Do With It?: Contemporary 
Lessons on Lawyerly Advocacy From the Preacher Martin Luther King, Jr., 22 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 296, 332 (2010) [hereinafter Cantrell, “What’s Love Got to Do With 
It?] (discussing that lawyers must express their commitment to respect others to 
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that both parties to the conversation can be sure that they are being heard.  
Additionally, it is only through overt normative conversations that each 
side can bring forward assumptions that they are making about what the 
other side wants for herself, or what they think the other side wants from 
them.  Taking Allison and her advocate again as an example, if there is no 
expanded conversation between them, then both Allison and her advocate 
likely make unhelpful, unstated assumptions.  Perhaps Allison’s advocate 
assumes that Allison’s interest in the shelter is because Allison thinks that 
is the safest, or only, option for her and the children.  Maybe Allison 
assumes that her advocate’s willingness to seek a protection order on her 
behalf means that the family law system supports some kind of retribution 
against an abusive spouse or parent.  Whatever the assumptions are, they 
are not helpful unless they are surfaced, discussed and checked with the 
other person. 
Further, bringing normative choices into the mix is the only true way to 
allow a woman subjected to abuse to explore and consider whether and 
when her own normative choices match up to the normative choices 
contained in the law and legal system that she is engaging.  Allison may 
feel very strongly that Nate has acted immorally.  Thus, she may be very 
upset to learn that the relevant law about whether parents will be permitted 
to spend time with their children does not focus on the morality of a 
parent’s past conduct toward the other parent, but on whether that conduct 
presents a physical or emotional safety issue for the children.42  Using and 
expanding the disruptive moment between the arising of the 
emotion/thought/sensation and acting upon it creates the most productive 
space possible in which a woman can experience being supported and 
heard, but also experience a frank, engaged exploration of the fullest range 
of options for action and the respective set of consequences.  Importantly, 
the expanded disruptive moment provides a woman subjected to abuse with 
protected space to try out changing her mind (including changing her mind 
many times) without worrying that it will be held against her. 
Now, I want to put a finer point on using the disruptive moment 
particularly to discourage action out of anger.  I want to offer two possible 
frames that I believe are consonant with a feminist commitment to creating 
space for a woman subjected to abuse to feel fully expressed, while also 
                                                          
clients); see also Robert K. Vischer, Moral Engagement Without the “Moral Law”: A 
Post-Canons View of Attorneys’ Moral Accountability, J. PROF. LAW. 213, 219 (2008) 
(describing that lawyers operate under multiple moral norms and must speak truth to 
power). 
 42. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a) (2010) (noting the 
presumption that both parents should have frequent and continuing contact with their 
children so long as a time with a parent does not “endanger the child’s physical health 
or significantly impair the child’s emotional development”). 
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creating space for multiple viewpoints to be considered and investigated 
before action occurs.  I also want to be clear again that I am approaching 
this from an instrumental position—conduct that comes from anger more 
likely than not leads to a result that does not help a woman subjected to 
abuse move towards a logistically-secure life nor towards a flourishing life.  
Therefore, the two frames I offer also are pragmatically focused.43  Further, 
both frames already are part of common discourse, so they should feel 
accessible both to advocates and to women subjected to abuse.  Thus, they 
are frames that, once introduced, can be used readily—between advocate 
and client, between advocates, and between women subjected to abuse.  
The first frame is a therapeutic or “healing” frame, and the second frame is 
cognitive processing. 
A therapeutic or healing frame that could be posed to a woman subjected 
to abuse might look something like: 
You have had the experience of abuse, as well as the experience of many 
emotions as you take steps to figure out what is best for you.  As you 
think about what could help you heal from the experience, you will need 
to examine each of your emotions and explore what role it is playing for 
you.  All of your emotional experiences are truthful and valid for you, 
and they also each offer up several different choices about how to act.  
You will want to have a safe space in which to talk through the choices 
you have about how to act so that your choices help you heal. 
The healing frame settles emotions and actions into a larger setting of 
well-being.  That frame is welcoming because it acknowledges actual 
experiences as well as a hope or desire to “feel better.” 
The initial frame, which is silent about any particular emotion, then 
would be refined to explore anger explicitly, as well as to explore other 
emotions.  The language of a therapeutic frame might include statements 
about anger such as: “Anger is something we feel.  It exists for a reason 
and always deserves our respect.”44  Or, “Anger is a signal, and one worth 
listening to.”45  Such statements validate the experience of anger’s arising, 
without validating action out of anger.  Then, the therapeutic frame can 
introduce the idea of actions from anger as ineffective.  An exemplary 
                                                          
 43. Of course, there are frames available in which the approach is a moral one.  
See, e.g., MURPHY, supra note 31, at 103 (arguing that lessons of moral humility cannot 
be ignored in the face of anger); Cantrell, What’s Love Got to Do With It?, supra note 
41, at 340 (expressing that a lawyer can accept that a client has a capacity for moral 
conversation and lawyer accordingly); Deborah J. Cantrell, Can Compassionate 
Practice Also Be Good Legal Practice?: Answers From the Lives of Buddhist Lawyers, 
12 RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION 1, 4-5 (2011) (noting that Buddhist values can inform 
ethical legal practice). 
 44. HARRIET LERNER, THE DANCE OF ANGER: A WOMAN’S GUIDE TO CHANGING 
THE PATTERNS OF INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS 4 (1985). 
 45. Id. at 1. 
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statement might be: “If feeling anger signals a problem, venting anger does 
not solve it.  Venting anger may serve to maintain, and even rigidify, the 
old rules and patterns in a relationship . . . .”46  In other words, the frame 
helps to signal that expressing anger does not help someone feel better. 
The point of the therapeutic frame is not to turn the advocate-client 
relationship into a therapist-client relationship.  The point is to pick up on a 
possible mindset of a woman subjected to abuse and to use that existing 
mindset as a way of introducing the idea of separating the arising of 
emotion/anger from action, and to introduce the idea that actions out of 
anger generally do not improve the situation (e.g., in the therapeutic frame, 
do not make one feel better).  It certainly may be the case that a woman 
subjected to abuse might also want to explore “healing” with a therapist, 
and that such exploration will assist her as she determines her actions with 
her advocate.  However, I do not think the usefulness of the frame is 
contingent on a woman participating in therapy or counseling.  Again, the 
usefulness of the frame in the advocacy setting is that it provides a 
supportive and welcoming way to create thoughtful space between arising 
and action. 
A cognitive processing frame might look something like: 
As you know from your own experiences, our bodies physically react to 
the emotions that we are seeing displayed by another person.  Our minds 
react, too.  Scientific studies show that emotions are “contagious.”47  
You have described how your abuser’s bad emotions affect you 
negatively and powerfully.  Scientific studies also have helped us 
understand that one part of our brain reacts very quickly to situations, 
especially stressful ones, and pushes us to make snap decisions such as 
whether to be afraid or whether to fight back.48  But, another part of our 
brain works more slowly and lets us take more time to consider our 
responses and actions.  We want to create a setting in which you can see 
what the fast part of your brain is telling you, but let the slow part of 
your brain help you make the best decision. 
The cognitive processing frame helps situate the arising of emotions and 
actions into a setting about instincts and decision making.  For a woman 
who describes herself as trying to make good choices, or trying to make 
decisions that will be good for herself and her children, the cognitive 
processing frame may resonate. 
                                                          
 46. Id. at 4. 
 47. DANIEL GOLEMAN, SOCIAL INTELLIGENCE: THE NEW SCIENCE OF HUMAN 
RELATIONSHIPS 14 (2006) (stating that tacit personal transactions between people 
amounts to the emotional economy). 
 48. Id. at 65 (finding that first impressions often predict that actual course of a 
person’s relationship with another person); see also DANIEL KANHEMAN, THINKING, 
FAST AND SLOW 13 (2011) (stating that the brain often searches spontaneously for an 
intuitive solution). 
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Once the general frame for cognitive processing is in place, it, too, can 
be used to consider anger more specifically.  For example, anger is an 
emotion that easily can trigger fast brain responses of “flight or fight.”  A 
woman subjected to abuse likely can recount her own fast brain responses 
to her abuser’s anger.  It also will likely make sense to her that one role of 
fast brain responses is to do work such as protecting safety.  Then, the 
frame introduces the other part of the brain—the slow brain—where more 
detailed and nuanced thinking takes place, but only with some time and 
space.  The frame validates the woman’s experience of anger and the way 
in which it triggers the part of the brain designed for rapid response, while 
introducing the productive potential of the part of the brain that works best 
when it differentiates between the arising of emotion and action.  The 
frame creates a place for a woman to locate her anger and to label it as a 
“fast” response, while then picking up on her goal to make better decisions 
by locating considered decision making in a different part of the brain. 
Just as the purpose of the healing frame was not to create a therapist-
patient relationship, the purpose of the cognitive frame is not to prompt a 
woman to see herself as part of a cognitive psychology experiment.  The 
point is to take advantage of an existing motivation (to make good 
decisions), and use the frame to reorient how one thinks about achieving 
that goal.  More specifically, the frame reorients in a way that breaks 
productively the conditioned link between anger and quick action. 
While both frames sound in arenas other than the law, neither frame 
requires an advocate to become an expert in another field.  An advocate 
does need to understand certain core concepts from other fields, like the 
idea of a decision making heuristic from cognitive psychology, and must be 
able to describe those core concepts to another non-expert.  But, the 
advocate does not need to be more of an expert than that.  Being fluent 
about areas in addition to the law is exactly the kind of competency that we 
routinely expect from almost every lawyer.  For example, lawyers who 
assist businesses with mergers and acquisitions must have a basic level of 
competency related to financial recordkeeping and disclosures.  Similarly, a 
lawyer who handles medical malpractice cases must have a basic level of 
competency about medical techniques at issue in her cases.  Just as the 
mergers and acquisitions or medical malpractice lawyers will supplement 
their core knowledge with expert knowledge, so, too, will domestic 
violence advocates supplement their core knowledge with expert advice. 
It certainly may be the case that there are other frames available that will 
take advantage of the disruptive moment between anger’s arising and 
action on anger, while also taking care to be supportive of the actual 
experiences of a woman subjected to abuse.  I have offered two frames that 
I suggest accomplish those two goals particularly well.  However, one of 
the benefits of feminist domestic violence advocacy’s recognition that each 
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woman’s particular experience is the place from which any action must be 
grounded is that advocates can be attentive to crafting disruptive frames 
that resonate most helpfully for each woman.  Some other possible sources 
of frames might include a woman’s religious tradition,49 or other cultural 
traditions.  The critical feature that the frame must have is that it separates 
an emotion’s arising from immediate conduct, which then can lead to an 
exploration of anger as an emotion compared to anger as a course of 
conduct. 
 CONCLUSION 
One of the most important contributions of feminism has been its 
insistence that women’s actual lived experiences must be the basis from 
which social change is derived.  More particularly for domestic violence 
advocacy, feminism (and feminist advocacy) broke down inaccurate belief 
systems and unhelpful law-related structures that had hidden the fact of 
most domestic violence and had prevented women subjected to abuse from 
seeking useful and supportive services.  As is always the case with social 
change advocacy, as advocates succeeded, they then discovered that their 
advocacy efforts brought unintended consequences.  That has been true for 
feminist domestic violence advocates.  They have seen their efforts to 
prompt law enforcement to respond at all to domestic violence calls turn 
into law enforcement policies that often now respond too vigorously or 
rigidly.  Similarly, feminist domestic violence advocates have seen their 
development of a “learned helplessness” justification for why a woman 
subjected to abuse might not leave an abusive relationship be recaptured by 
patriarchal ideas of femininity.  Fortunately, feminist domestic violence 
advocates have been attentive to those unintended consequences and have 
adjusted appropriately. 
However, feminist domestic violence advocates and theorists have not 
attended appropriately to the unintended consequences of how feminist 
discourse has treated anger.  Feminist discourse has relied heavily upon 
individual autonomy, described as a woman’s power to make her own 
choices, as its animating normative principle.  In its vigorous use of 
autonomy, feminism has created the unintended consequence of exalting 
anger.  However, taking action out of anger often does not lead a woman to 
make choices that help her move towards a more flourishing life.  There is 
a way that feminist domestic violence advocates can discourage actions out 
of anger while still protecting and supporting a woman’s ability to make 
individualized, autonomous choices. 
                                                          
 49. See generally DEBORAH J. CANTRELL, With Compassion and Lovingkindness: 
One Feminist Buddhist’s Exploration of Feminist Domestic Violence Advocacy, in 
FEMINISM, LAW AND RELIGION (M. Failinger et al., eds., forthcoming 2013). 
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Feminist domestic violence advocates can more distinctly separate the 
experience of an emotion arising from the actions that one takes because of 
an emotion.  When one is able to create a disruptive moment between an 
emotion’s arising and conduct caused by the emotion, one creates space to 
take two important steps.  First, one can affirm the fact that an emotion has 
arisen—it is was it is.  The fact of its arising does not dictate conduct.  
Once the habituated rush from an emotion’s arising to conduct is broken, 
one then has time to reflect more thoroughly on choices about action.  
Through reflection, one more likely is able to attend to multiple 
perspectives, to be able truly to hear advice and guidance, and, thus, to 
reach choices about conduct that is better designed to lead to flourishing. 
In this Article, I have offered two possible ways to take advantage of the 
disruptive moment.  Undoubtedly feminist domestic violence advocates 
and women subjected to abuse themselves will find other techniques.  
However, I urge all participants to remain mindful of the central premise of 
this Article—that the ardency with which feminist discourse embraced 
autonomy has created some unhelpful unintended consequences.  More 
particularly for domestic violence, the ardent approach to autonomy means 
that feminist discourse talks about protecting any kind of choice, even 
unhelpful choices like those made out of anger.  Fortunately, while feminist 
discourse at times can be rigid, the actions of feminist domestic violence 
advocates already have been more nuanced.  This Article seeks to 
illuminate and advance those opportunities for nuance, and, thus, to create 
greater possibilities for women subjected to abuse to move more fully into 
flourishing lives. 
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